Thomas F. Crimson v. The Western Company of North America : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
Thomas F. Crimson v. The Western Company of
North America : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Walter P. Faber; Watkins and Faber; Attorney for Appellant.
John R. Anderson; Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke and Vincent; Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Crimson v. Western Company, No. 860121.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/937






^OKET NO. y * O ^ I ~ C / f c 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS F. CRISMON, t 
Plaint i f f - Appellant, : O&0/J?/~-3& 
vs . s Case No. 20668 
THE WESTERN COMPANY OF NORTH ; 
AMERICA, a Delaware 
corporation, : 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH, JUDGE 
JOHN R. ANDERSON 
Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke & Vincent 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
185 North Vernal Avenue, Suite 1 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: 789-1201 
WALTER P. FABER, JR. 
Watkins & Faber 
Attorney for Plaintiff- Appellant 
2102 East 3300 South r—•• B-"*I 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 I—II C l 
Telephone: 486-5634 I ILLLJ 
AU62719S8 
Ctefk, Suoitdme Coi SKIT 
SUPRE^ 
THOMAS F. CRISMON, 
P l a i n t 1 1 I.-Appt.4 l.iiil 
vs . 
THE WESTERN COMPANY v£ 
NORTH AMERICA, a Delaware 
orporation, 
Defendant -Respond e;: 
Case No. 20668 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKJ. . NTY 
THE HONORABLE JOHN A. RC*T' ! "T» ' 
. JU1L1N t\ >i/£RSi \T 
B e a s l i r ; , i^ygaa; . . oke & V i n c e n t 
>rney f o r Defendan t -Responden t 
v : ? r th Verna l Aven :^'*- -«-»i-- n 
v c i a m , i. +; a n 84 0 7 c~> 
Telephone: 789-1201 
WALTER I-;..:.--:-
Watkins d Fabe: 
tr'-orne." for Pla; :. Appellant 
-liu2 Ea's* 3300 S--«-rh 
S a l t Lake C i t v . .;. b4109 
"elephont •A-
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 5 
I. THERE WAS NEVER AN AGREEMENT ON ESSENTIAL 
TERMS SUFFICIENT TO FORM A CONTRACT 5 
II. APPELLANT DID NOT COMPLETE HIS PROJECT 
UPON RELIANCE ON RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS 8 
III. APPELLANT'S APRIL LEASE DOCUMENT WAS A 
COUNTER OFFER; WESTERN CLEARLY REJECTED 
IT BY ITS TENDER OF THE SECOND LEASE 
DOCUMENT IN JUNE 9 
CONCLUSION 11 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES: 
Campbell v. Nelson, 101 Utah 523, 125 P.2d 413 
(1942) . . . 6 
McDonald v. Barton Brothers Investment, 631 
P.2d $51 (Utah 19$1) • . . 6 
Ovard v. Cannon, 600 P. 2d 1246 (Utah 1979) 9 
Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 
(1953) . . 7 
i i 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS F. CRISMON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
THE WESTERN COMPANY OF 
NORTH AMERICA, a Delaware : 
corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 20668 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
This case is not technically a statute of frauds1 
case. It is a contract case. Western's letter of January 
11, 1982, is heavily relied upon by appellant as being a 
"memorandum sufficient" to satisfy the statute of frauds. 
Respondent's position is that a memorandum required by the 
statute of frauds presupposes a prior valid agreement and 
meeting of the minds of the parties; the agreement between 
the parties in this case was not complete as to essential 
terms and particulars so as to support an agreement, no 
matter how exhaustively writing may exist to affirm parts 
of the agreement. There was simply never an agreement 
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containing the essential required terms to support a claim 
in this case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In December 1981, appellant owned five duplex 
lots (4, 5, 6, 7 and 8) in Vernal, Utah. (R. 306). 
2. At that time he had completed approximately 
ninety percent of the construction on lots 4 and 5. His 
contractor was on the site and he had installed concrete 
foundations and excavations on lots 6, 7 and 8. (R. 387). 
3. Appellant had obtained a commitment for 
permanent financing on lots 6, 7 and 8. (R. 306). 
4. A meeting between Joseph Eppes and Thomas 
Crismon was arranged by Tom Clark, a broker who was working 
with and acting as selling agent for Thomas F. Crismon. 
(R. 347). 
5. Thomas F. Crismon did not have a signed sales 
agency agreement with Clark as they were both experienced 
realtors and Thomas F. Crismon testified that he held a real 
estate license. (R. 345). 
6. Mr. Eppes, from his observation at the meeting 
in December of 1981, testified that it appeared to him Mr. 
Crismon was building the duplexes as fast as he could and 
intended to go ahead notwithstanding what Mr. Eppes decided 
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to do. (R. 386, 387). During their meeting in December 
of 1981, Mr. Eppes and Mr. Crismon discussed general terms 
for a lease and Mr. Eppes left indicating that he would 
have his legal department, who had proper authority to 
proceed, prepare a lease and get it to Mr. Crismon. (R. 
369, 370). 
7. The letter admitted as evidence from Joseph 
Eppes dated January 11, 1982, was merely an outline of 
Western Companies1 willingness to enter into and complete 
negotiations for a lease with some of the basic terms as 
outlined. 
8. There was substantial evidence in the record, 
as testified to by Mr. Eppes, about the fact that it was 
very important for The Western Company to have a total 
management concept whereby the owner would be responsible 
for not only complete management of the units, but for 
collecting damages from the tenants or being responsible 
for damages to the buildings as well. This point was 
emphasized clearly by Mr. Eppes in the discussions in 
December of 1981. (R. 384, 385). 
9. There is no direct evidence in the record 
that The Western Company ever agreed to omit lot 7. 
10. In March 1982, The Western Company sent a 
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Lease Agreement which contained precisely the provisions 
The Western Company would agree to and which encompassed 
the subject matter of the negotiations and the proposed 
agreement. 
11. Thereafter, in April 1982, appellant sent 
a Lease Agreement to Western materially altering some of 
the basic provisions in the lease, the most grievous of 
which was the management responsibility provision which 
was always insisted upon by The Western Company. This 
proposed lease was accompanied by a letter which on direct 
examination of Crismon was composed by and contained words 
of art prepared by Crismonsf attorney, although not on 
Crismons! attorney's letterhead. (R. 326). 
12. Crismon testified that he received an offer 
sometime in May on lot 7 and in fact based on that offer 
sold lot 7 to an independent buyer in July. (R. 347) . 
13. There is a direct contradiction of evidence 
in the record as respects Mr. Eppesf recollection of 
acknowledging Westerns1 agreement to the lease tendered by 
Crismon and what Crismon testified to. (R. 398, 399). 
14. In the last week of June 1982, a Lease 
Agreement was again executed and sent from Western which 
was the agreement Western would agree to and was open for 
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acceptance by Crismon up until as late as September 30, 
when the month-to-month tenancy subsisting between the 
parties was terminated. (R. 399). 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THERE WAS NEVER AN AGREEMENT ON ESSENTIAL 
TERMS SUFFICIENT TO FORM A REPORT 
Of critical importance in this case is the fact 
that Mr. Crismon was just as experienced in real estate 
matters as was Mr. Eppes. It should also be noted that 
Mr. Eppes, as an agent of the Western Company, had no 
direct authority to bind The Western Company by any kind 
of an oral contract and Mr. Crismon was made aware of that 
fact. Mr. Eppes indicated that the legal department 
would draft the lease and the lease was in fact prepared 
and sent to Crismon which contained the essential terms 
certainly agreed upon by the parties and to which Western 
would agree. 
The lease as proposed and as sent to Mr. Crismon 
was a very fair document and a good deal for Crismon. It 
was only by his assertion to change the essential terms 
of the agreement to more comply to what he wanted that 
cost him the entire transaction in this case. 
-5-
The purpose of the statute of frauds particularly 
in complicated real estate matters or long term leases is 
simply to avoid the kind of mischief that presents itself 
in this case. 
If Mr. Crismon, with his expert real estate 
knowledge, was so concerned about not proceeding until he 
had a definite lease, he should have been advised to 
wait until he in fact had a definite lease. The Western 
Company in good faith proposed a lease to him, but which 
Mr. Crismon insisted on changing material and substantive 
terms. 
There must be an agreement of all terms with 
sufficient definiteness. See Campbell v. Nelson, 101 Utah 
523, 125 P. 2d 413 (1942), and see also, McDonald v. Barton 
Brothers Investment, 631 P. 2d 851 (Utah 1981); held a 
memo insufficient where essential terms were not all 
contained. It is clear that in the present case, there 
was never an executed lease because the parties simply 
could not or would not agree on the significant terms. 
Again, this is exactly the mischief the statute of frauds 
is supposed to avoid. 
One of the objective facts of this case that 
is interesting is the sale of lot 7. There is some 
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discussion in the Crismon letters about a zoning or 
easement problem; this apparently did not prohibit him 
from constructing a duplex on lot 7 and selling the 
duplex in fact to a good faith offerer which offer was 
received, according to his testimony, in May of 1982. 
Respondent believes that this simple isolated bit of 
objective evidence is indicative of the fact that at the 
time Crismon accepted the offer he did not really consider 
himself bound by the Western lease. The Coirrt properly 
concluded that the lease was still in the negotiating 
process and the ruling of the Court accurately reflects 
this fact. 
This Court has consistently shown reluctance 
to modify the rigors of the statute of frauds with respect 
to land provisions. See Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 
260 P.2d 570 (1953). The appellant states in his 
memorandum that The Western Company submitted a lease 
which did not conform to the agreement of the parties. To 
the contrary by the extensive evidence in the record from 
the testimony of Mr. Eppes, the management and respons-
ibility concept was extensively discussed. (R. 385). 
The Western lease was consistent with those discussions; 
the Crismon lease was not. Obviously there was never a 
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meeting of the minds and there was never a complete 
agreement with respect to the lease. 
The trial court in considering the exhibits 
and the testimony of the witnesses properly ruled that 
there was never an agreement sufficient to provide 
liability in this case. 
II. 
APPELLANT DID NOT COMPLETE HIS PROJECT 
UPON RELIANCE ON RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS 
From listening to the witnesses and from the 
entire record in this case, the trial court found by 
clear preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Crismon was 
well under way with the completion of his project and 
would have completed his project in all probability in 
any event if Western Company had not been involved. 
This is the practical conclusion from the 
entire context of the record and from the trial courtfs 
direct observations based upon his observations of the 
witnesses and from the testimony of the record. 
Mr. Crismon was involved in a real estate 
investment plan. The record is clear he had secured 
permanent financing for the whole project. The record 
is further clear and not disputed that two of the units 
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were ninety to ninety-five percent complete and the other 
units had the foundations poured, excavation work done and 
the contractor was on the site in late December of 1981. 
The findings and judgment of the trial court are 
entitled to a "presumption of correctness11 and will not be 
upset unless the evidence "clearly preponderates against 
them". Ovard v. Cannon, 600 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1979). 
III. 
APPELLANT'S APRIL LEASE DOCUMENT WAS A COUNTER 
OFFER; WESTERN CLEARLY REJECTED IT BY ITS TENDER 
OF THE SECOND LEASE DOCUMENT IN JUNE 
Much is said in Appellant's Brief about Western 
continuing to pay rental for nine months. It is important 
to note that Western's position was made entirely clear to 
the appellant in the second lease document which was fully 
executed and sent to Crismon in June of 1982. Through the 
remaining days of the month of June, the entire month of 
July, the entire month of August and the first fifteen days 
in September, that lease document was tendered and in the 
hands of Crismon having been fully executed by Western and 
which contained all of the essential terms which would have 
been acceptable to Western. Thus, for approximately ninety 
days, The Western Company was in a position to be bound to 
the five year lease which was consistent with Mr. Eppes' 
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original negotiations. The pure and simple fact of the 
matter is, and as properly concluded by the trial court, 
Crismon did not accept it and accordingly, there was no 
lease. The basic differences in the lease documents, 
upon which there was apparently never a meeting of the 
minds, had to do with a very important concept to The 
Western Company. The record is extensive in Mr. Eppes1 
testimony concerning these matters. (R. 385, 386). 
Western wanted to secure a place for housing for its 
employees, but did not want to assume responsibility for 
wear, tear, depreciation and damage to the units and to 
have to invest substantial sums in the units at the end 
of the lease term for repainting, recarpeting and repairs. 
This fact was always asserted clearly by Mr. Eppes and 
was just simply never agreed to by Mr. Crismon. 
It should be noted that this was the most 
substantial disagreement between the parties, although 
Mr. Crismon did make other changes in his proposed lease 
tendered back to The Western Company, any of which were 
material enough so as to convince the trial court, and 
properly so, that there was never an actual agreement 
containing the essential terms so as to bind anyone to 
a contract in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Crismon was experienced in real estate 
investments and he had a real estate license. Mr. Eppes, 
although no longer employed at Western, at the time relevant 
to this case was manager of their housing department. These 
were sophisticated real estate businessmen trying to come to 
an understanding concerning essential terms for a long term 
lease. The trial court properly concluded, after observing 
witnesses and listening to the testimony, that the essential 
terms basic to the lease were never agreed upon. There was 
simply never a meeting of the minds. Therefore, there could 
be no lease formation based on any written memorandums or by 
subsequent actions of the parties. In fact, there were as 
many actions on the part of Crismon evidencing the fact he 
did not consider himself bound by a lease, for example, the 
unilateral sale of Lot 7. 
The trial court's decision should be affirmed. 
DATED this ^ Q^"day of August, 1985. 
Respectably submitted, 
JYGXARD, COKE & VINCENT 
(John R. Anderson 
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